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ABSTRACT 
Over the course of their history, bilateral Sino-Japanese relations have 
experienced a paradoxical relationship of autonomy and interdependence, mutual respect 
and suspicion, and admiration and condescension.  The approach these regional powers 
take towards their bilateral relations – whether it is competition, cooperation, or the status 
quo – will circumscribe the framework for regional stability in the coming decades.  To 
the casual observer, the cultural animosities stemming from World War II atrocities 
might indicate that diplomatic relations will be forever troubled.  However, mutually 
beneficial economic ties have always existed between these two compatible economies.   
This thesis unravels the complex relationship by examining the salient diplomatic, 
economic, and security issues.  It finds that the doomsayers who cite virulent anti-
Japanese nationalism in China are too pessimistic and the liberally inclined advocates of 
economic interdependence are too optimistic.  It also finds that security concerns in the 
Taiwan Straits and the East China Sea have generally been quelled by the pragmatic 
political elites on both sides, who have managed to diffuse any potential escalation into 
armed conflict.  Thus, the future for Sino-Japanese relations portends a continuation of 
the status quo, with bounded fluctuations between the optimists and the doomsayers. 
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I. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: COOPERATION, 
COMPETITION, OR STATUS QUO?  
A. PURPOSE 
Over the course of their history, bilateral Sino-Japanese relations have 
experienced a paradoxical relationship of autonomy and interdependence, mutual respect 
and suspicion, and admiration and condescension that continues to shape the Asian 
political landscape.1  The purpose of this thesis is to answer the fundamental question of 
where is the bilateral relationship headed, and then assess the implications for U.S. 
foreign policy in the region. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The United States National Security Strategy places considerable importance on 
East Asian regional stability.  The February 2007 report by Armitage and Nye affirms 
that "stability in East Asia will rest on the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations, and even 
though the United States is closely allied with Japan, Washington should encourage good 
relations among all three." 2   Hence, the Sino-Japanese bilateral relations affect 
Washington’s approach to policy in the Pacific theater.  Since the end of World War II, 
the relationship has vacillated between short periods of attraction and friendship and 
longer periods of repulsion and enmity.  Since the early 1990’s, public opinion on either 
side of the East China Sea has dramatically dropped from once favorable opinion to now 
negative sentiments.  Since the end of World War II, Japan’s security alliance with the 
United States and economic ascension to the world’s second largest economy has tilted 
the context of the Sino-Japanese relationship in Japan’s favor.  However, the end of the 
Cold War has created an international context in which both nations are more or less 
equal powers.  The approach these regional powers take towards their bilateral relations – 
                                                 
1 Akira Iriye, The Chinese and the Japanese (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
2 Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2007, 14. 
 2
whether it is cooperation, competition, or the status quo – will circumscribe the 
framework for regional stability in the coming decades. 
Gilbert Rozman, professor of sociology at Princeton University, sorts the outlook 
for Sino-Japanese relations into three categories: 1) optimists, who focus on regional 
economic interdependence, 2) pessimists, who focus on great power rivalry, and 3) 
doomsayers, who emphasize anti-Japanese nationalism that may ultimately lead to a third 
Sino-Japanese War.3  This thesis examines the perspective of the doomsayers by looking 
at the affects of anti-Japanese nationalism on diplomacy, then the perspective of the 
optimists by looking at the causality of economic interdependence and security 
cooperation, and the perspective of the pessimists by looking at the security relationship.  
Drawing from the conclusions of the diplomatic, economic, and security chapters, the 
final chapter assesses whether Sino-Japanese relations will remain “status quo” and 
recommends a mixture of economic engagement and security hedging policies. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The expansive scholarship invested into the volumes of literature on Sino-
Japanese relations can be divided into two categories -- international relations based and 
policy focused -- and each category has three different schools of thought.  The first 
category places the relationship within the framework of international relations and the 
three schools of thought on the likely course of Sino-Japanese relations are as follows: 1) 
Cooperation based on “liberal” economic interdependence, 2) Confrontation based on 
“realist” security interests and irreconcilable historical animosity, and 3) Status quo or 
continued economic interdependence, but without convergence on diplomatic relations.4  
The cooperation school of thought asserts that both sides officially advocate regional 
stability and continued economic interdependence citing as evidence the recent Asian 
                                                 
3 Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Mutual Images and the Balance Between Globalization 
and Regionalism,” Asia Program Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, No 
113, July 2003, 8. 
4 Wolf Mendl, Issues in Japan’s China Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); David 
Chibbet, The Japan-China Phenomena: Conflict or Compatibility? (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd: 
1975).  
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summitry where both sides have been optimistic about further collaboration. 5   The 
confrontation school of thought is more pessimistic citing ongoing territorial disputes, 
potential confrontation for scarce resources, and worsening tensions regarding military 
build-up and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.6  
Several pessimist scholars point to the “historical” issues over such hot-button issues as 
history textbooks, war reconciliation, and Yasukuni shrine visits, which have effectively 
stymied more cordial diplomatic relations.7  Finally, the “status quo” school puts the 
relationship within the context of the broader strategic security and economic context, but 
portends that the influence of nationalistic movements fueled by historical enmity will 
prevent substantial diplomatic accommodation. 8   
The second major category filters the context of the bilateral relationship through 
the policy lens and approaches the relationship from the policy making perspectives of 
Beijing, Tokyo, or Washington.  The Beijing perspective views Japan’s actions as 
aggressive and indicative of its inherent militaristic tendencies.9  Chinese scholars and 
Japanese right-wing watchers point to Japan’s constitutional reform movement, potential 
                                                 
5 For an analysis on theories of interdependence, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997).  James J. Przystup, “Japan-
China Relations: Ice Breaks at the Summit,” Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East 
Asian Bilateral Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Honolulu, HI), November 2006. 
6 See Michael Green, “The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino-Japanese Relations,” in 
China’s Foreign Policy, eds Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006) 162-182; Tsuneo Akaha, “U.S.-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Japanese 
Foreign Policy Today, eds Inoguchi and Jain (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 198-224; Robert Marquand, 
“Nationalism Drives China, Japan Apart,” The Christian Science Monitor, Dec 29, 2005; Allen S. Whiting, 
China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
7 See Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations (London: Routledge, 1998); 
Danielle F. S. Cohen, “Retracing the Triangle: China’s Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies Number 2 (2005); Akira Iriye, China and Japan in 
the Global Setting (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
8 See Robert S. Ross, Managing a Changing Relationship: China’s Japan Policy in the 1990’s 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996); Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy 
Priorities and Their Implications for the United States, (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 2000),79-95; Dick 
Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: 
U.S. Policy Choices” CRS Report for Congress, Jan 13, 2006; Daojiong Zha, “The Taiwan Problem in 
Japan-China relations: An Irritant or Destroyer?” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Spring 2001, 205-
224; Peggy F. Meyer, “Sino-Japanese Relations: The Economic Security Nexus,” in Politics and 
Economics in Northeast Asia, ed Tsuneo Akaha (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 135-157. 
9 Jing-Dong Yuan, “Chinese Perspective on U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” paper presented at a Conference 
at the Monterey Institute for International Studies held 4 March 2007. 
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nuclear weapons capability, and politically conservative leanings as indicative of Japan’s 
threat to China.10  The Tokyo perspective views China’s actions as intended to stymie 
Japan’s national comprehensive power.11  China watchers from both Japan and the U.S. 
point to the PRC’s aggressive actions during the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, the build up 
of intermediate range ballistic missiles, and conflicts in the East China Sea as signals of 
China’s quest for East Asian predominance.12  Finally, the Washington perspective lays 
out the best policy options that balance U.S. national interests against the struggles 
between these Asian powers.13  Asian affairs watchers generally offer policy options that 
accommodate both sides in multi-level, meaning Track I (official), Track II (semi-official 
and non-governmental) and Track III (public), engagement strategies. 14   Several 
important questions arise from closer examination of the Sino-Japanese relationship, like 
whether a security dilemma will emerge, or whether economic interdependence alone can 
foster good will, or whether the negative trends in cultural affinity could be reversed.  In 
addition to those questions, the fundamental question this thesis seeks to answer is what 
are the trends for future Sino-Japanese relations? 
                                                 
10 Wu Xinbo, “The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No.2 (March-April, 2000); 296-310; Wan Ming, Sino-Japanese Relations: 
Interaction, Logic, and Transformation, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Wenran Jiang, “New 
Dynamics of Sino-Japanese Relations,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 1, (2007): 15-41;  
11 Akio Takahara, “Japanese NGOs in China,” paper presented at the East Asian Institute’s 
Conference on China-Japan Relations: Conflict and Cooperation, August 1–2, 2002, Singapore. 
12 Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?,” International Security, Vol. 
31, No. 1, (Summer 2006): 81-126; Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, 
Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No.1, (2007): 127-167; Young C. Kim, “Japanese 
Policy Towards China: Politics of the Imperial Visit to China in 1992,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, 
(Summer 2001): 225-242; The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, March 
2007. 
13 Ezra Vogel, “The United States Perspective” in The Age of Uncertainty: The U.S.-Japan-China 
Triangle from 1989 to 2001, eds by Ezra Vogel, Yuan Ming, Akihiko Tanaka, Harvard East Asian 
Monographs Online, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004). 
14 Camilla T. N. Soerensen, “Strategic “Traingularity” in Northeast Asia: The Sino-Japanese Security 
Relationship and U.S. Policy,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3, (2006): 99-128; James Kelly, et al., Sino-
Japanese Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report, 
April 2007; Paul Midford, “China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, (2004): 113-145; Melvin Gurtov, “Options for 
Reconciling China and Japan,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 1, (2007): 169-175; Peter Van Ness, 
comment on “Japan-China Joint History Project” The Reconciliation Between Japan and China and the 
Cooperative Consultative Network Blog, comment posted March 23, 2007, http://china-japan-
reconciliation.blogspot.com/2007/03/japan-china-joint-history-project.html, (accessed May 22, 2007). 
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D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The author will make assessments on the varying viewpoints regarding the 
direction of Sino-Japanese relations and formulate a policy recommendation based on the 
analysis of current trends.  A thorough analysis of the key areas of conflict will address 
the social, cultural, economic, and security barriers to better bilateral relations.   
This thesis uses a combination of both primary and secondary sources to assess 
each country’s national interests and policy choices.  In addition, personal interviews 
with both Chinese and Japanese experts in their field have been used to analyze potential 
courses of action.  Professor Jing-Dong Yuan from the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies and Professor Akio Takahara from Tokyo University represent the Chinese 
perspective, and Professor Seiichiro Takagi from Aoyama Gakuin University, Mr. 
Masayuki Masuda and Dr. Yasuhiro Matsuda from the National Institute of Defense 
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II. DIPLOMATIC ISSUES: THE EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When discussing Sino-Japanese relations with interested observers, a common 
observation is that the emotional nature of anti-Japanese nationalism prevents Chinese 
from having “rational” conversations about Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.15  For the 
purposes of this chapter “nationalism” refers not to the patriotic national pride that was 
exhibited at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics or in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
but rather the hate-filled sentiment echoed in terms like “little Japanese” (xiao riben) and 
“devils” (guizi) that is often perpetuated in anti-Japanese riots, demonstrations, and 
internet chatrooms.16  How much influence does this type of nationalism have on the 
overall relationship between Japan and China?  This chapter makes the case that 
nationalism is a constraining factor that weakens the outlook for optimists, but it is also 
constrained by several factors that prevent a “doomsday” scenario.  
1. The Framework 
This chapter is organized into four parts.  The first part highlights four different 
arguments that forewarn of a worsening anti-Japanese nationalism in China.  The next 
part acknowledges the cause for concern, but puts forward counter-arguments for why 
alarmists need not worry.  The third part underscores the already existing 
interdependencies within the region and highlights some positive signs for the 
convergence of national interests.  Finally, the last part draws some conclusions on the 
effects of future Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Comments from Frank Hawke at the Naval Postgraduate School, Chairman, Greater China Kroll, 
Beijing, a long time China observer February 6, 2007. 
16 Peter Hays Gries, “China’s “New Thinking on Japan,” The China Quarterly, 2005, 837. 
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B. NATIONALISM INFLAMES EMOTIONAL DOMESTIC FORCES 
At the heart of the argument that anti-Japanese nationalism will ultimately divide 
these nations are the premises that 1) historical enmity runs deeply into society and 
cannot be ameliorated until there has been satisfactory reconciliation, 2) the 
sensationalistic media are getting worse and not better and imperfect information will 
continue indefinitely, 3) issues of territorial sovereignty are important enough that 
Beijing would risk war to resolve them, and 4) Beijing is highly influenced by anti-
Japanese public opinion and protests. 
1. Historical Enmity Runs Deep 
The conventional wisdom put forth by prominent scholars studying Chinese 
nationalism is that the root causes of virulent anti-Japanese nationalism stem from 
Japanese insincere apologies, mistreatment of Chinese people, lack of reconciliation, and 
whitewashing of history.17  Chinese scholars have said that the Japanese apologies appear 
insincere because they only came after much Chinese diplomatic pressure.18  Chinese 
complain that Japan has shirked responsibility for the war and failed to compensate 
individual Chinese citizens who suffered directly at the hands of the Japanese Imperial 
Army, including comfort women, forced laborers, and mistreated POWs.19  In the eyes of 
the Chinese public, Japan’s perceived lack reconciliation instigates hatred because Japan 
needs to do more (i.e., apologize more, give more, repent more) before they will forgive 
Japan for its wartime atrocities.   
Even though Beijing may be more pragmatic, according to Chinese scholars, large 
swaths of Chinese society resent Japanese whitewashing of historical facts, the lack of 
                                                 
17 Robert Marquand, “Nationalism drives China, Japan apart,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
December 29, 2005; Peter Hays Gries, “China’s “New Thinking on Japan,” The China Quarterly, 2005. 
18 Jing-Dong Yuan, “Chinese Perspective on U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Paper presented at Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, March 4, 2007 
19 Hugo Restall, “Opposing the Sun: Japan Alienates Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 
2005, 8. 
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sincerity in restitution, and some even fear resurgence in militarism.20  Compared to the 
German post-World War II openness regarding history, the Chinese point is well made 
because there have been no bilateral agreements on history textbooks or commonly vetted 
memorials to the victims of war.21  The inability of scholars to agree upon the basic 
precepts of the historical record adds to the complicated issue of unraveling history.  In 
2005, a joint Sino-Japanese commission to study history was given a charter to produce a 
report by 2008.  However, when Ezra Vogel was asked to comment on the progress of the 
commission, he indicated that the political and emotional viewpoints were preventing an 
unbiased scholarly approach and leading to quarrels.22  Scholars like Thomas Berger say 
the history problem will not go away because the Cold War forces that kept the 
xenophobic sentiment bottled up no longer exist, allowing the brooding sentiment to 
grow and be exploited by factions that benefit from demonizing the unknown.23   
2. A Sensationalized Media Exacerbates the Sino-Japanese Divide 
Susan Shirk’s recent study of media outlets in China demonstrate a proclivity to 
propagate xenophobic news stories in a vicious cycle that further exacerbates inherent 
nationalistic tendencies.  She asserts that Chinese media sources compete with each other 
to appeal to potential audiences and tend to publish one-sided stories in order to increase 
readership.24  In addition, the general public tends to trust non-official sources more than 
the officially sanctioned news sources.  The net affect is less accurate and more 
                                                 
20 Yinan He, “History, Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” (paper prepared for the 
Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, March 19, 2005), 13. 
21 Preechayana Wongaroon, “Comparison of Reconciliation between Franco-German and Sino-
Japanese Relations,” August 27, 2006, Reconciliation Between China and Japan and the Cooperative 
Security Network, http://china-japan-reconciliation.blogspot.com/2006/08/comparison-of-reconciliation-
between.html, (accessed September 17, 2007). 
22 Ezra Vogel, When ask about his expectation of the China-Japan Joint History Research Committee, 
Beijing Review, Reporting from New York, April 10, 2007. 
23 Thomas U. Berger, “Of Shrines and Hooligans: The Structure of the History Problem in East Asia 
after 9/11,” Presentation at Boston University, October 28, 2005. 
24 Susan Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China,” Japanese Journal of Political 
Science, 8 (1), April 2007: 43. 
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sensationalized information.  In fact, Shirk’s conclusion is that the media drive the anti-
Japanese sentiment, thus forcing Beijing’s foreign policy to react to public opinion.25 
3. Territorial Disputes Inflame Nationalistic Sentiment 
Territorial issues that carry intonations of violating sovereignty are often the most 
violent and emotional disputes with Japan.  In China, the disputes over the Diaoyu Islets 
created a firestorm of protest in 1990, 1996, and again in 2003.  A nationalistic public 
outcry called upon Beijing to defend China’s “national dignity.”26  Downs and Saunders, 
report that on September 13-14, 2006, “the PLA practiced blockades and landings on 
islands off Liaoning Province that may have been intended to warn Tokyo against further 
incursions on the Diaoyu Islands.”27 
In 2004, several rounds of negotiations regarding the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) in the East China Sea between China’s Foreign Ministry and Japan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs resulted in an impasse.  While not directly related, in July 2004, a Han-
class submarine entered Japanese waters, seemingly to probe Japan’s underwater 
detection capabilities.  The PLA’s increasing offensive capabilities and increasing 
defense budget are a cause for concern among U.S. and Japanese defense strategists.28  
The major security concern is that the Beijing will need to base its legitimacy on its 
pledge to uphold China’s sovereignty and will choose military options to respond to 
territorial issues for the sake of Chinese pride, honor, and national unity.  Beijing’s 
aggressive actions in the Spratly Islands and adamant insistence on its territorial rights to 
Taiwan indicate that it will not give up the Diaoyu Islets without a fight. 
 
                                                 
25 Susan Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China,” Japanese Journal of Political 
Science, 8 (1), April 2007: 68-69. 
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4. Bottom-up Approach to Xenophobic Nationalism in China 
Even though Beijing maintains an authoritarian hold on Chinese society, the 
accumulated enmity towards Japanese transgression has lead to visible and increasingly 
frequent anti-Japanese protests, which constrain Beijing’s foreign policy options and 
force the government into a reactive mode.  The following is a list of protests in 2003: 
 
• August 4, 2003: In Qiqihar, protesting the inadvertent discovery of a cache of 
World War II Japanese chemical weapons that lead to one death and 43 injuries,29  
• September 30, 2003: In Zhuhai, protesting an orgy of Japanese tourists with 
Chinese prostitutes on September 18th (anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge 
incident),30,  
• October 9, 2003: From Zhejiang, 13 protestors attempted to land on Diaoyu 
Island,31 
• November 3, 2003: In Xi’an, protesting a lewd skit by Japanese University 
students,32 
Anti-Japanese incidents in China culminated in April 2005 with demonstrations 
occurring in multiple cities throughout China following a combination of announcements 
regarding the Japanese Ministry of Education’s release of a controversial history textbook 
and regarding Japan’s potential bid for permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council.   
In many respects, Chinese political leaders are reluctant to embrace Japan because 
of the lessons learned from the demise of Hu Yaobang, which was partially attributed to 
his pro-Japanese foreign policy stance in the late 1980s.33  Subsequently, both Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao have been cautious not to alienate internal hard-line factions 
                                                 
29 “Relic of War Adds to Strain in Beijing Ties with Tokyo,” The New York Times, August 12, 2003 
30 “China Angered by Reported Orgy Involving Japanese Tourists,” The New York Times, September 
30, 2003. 
31 “Reclaiming the Diaoyu Islands: a volunteer memoir,” Beijing Times, November 13, 2003, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200311/13/eng2003113_128219.shtml, (accessed September 20, 2007). 
32 “Culture Clash: Curtain still raised on Chinese protests over ‘obscene skit’,” Asahi.com, November 
3, 2003. 
33 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 17-49.  
 12
regarding their Japan policy.  China watcher Peter Hays Gries speculated that the Ma 
Licheng article espousing a “new thinking” towards Japan was promulgated by Hu 
Jintao’s think-tank to get a feel for the receptiveness of the Chinese public to forgive 
Japan for past atrocities and approach the relationship as equals.34  The negative reaction 
and death threats thrust onto Ma Licheng showed that timing in 2003 was not right for 
such an approach and Hu has remained cautious since that trial balloon failed. 
A recent internet phenomenon of fenqing (indignant) young people has been 
grabbing headlines in the Chinese press for overt acts of anti-Japanese nationalism, like 
splashing human waste on a Chinese actress, who wore a dress resembling the Japanese 
flag.35  In 2005, the 101-story Mori building being built in Shanghai’s Pudong Financial 
District ran into anti-Japanese protests when the mayor of Shanghai objected to a design 
feature that looked like a “rising sun” over Shanghai.36  The fact that 90,000 on-line 
protestors effectively diverted the award of a Shanghai-Beijing railway contract from a 
Japanese company for $12B to a more expensive German proposal shows that public 
opinion does indeed constrain economic ties.37  When grouped together in this context, it 
is not inconceivable that scholars would broadly draw the same conclusion -- that the tap 
root of nationalism within Chinese society is genuine hatred towards Japan for wartime 
atrocities and a fear of a resurgent militarism.   
C.  CAUSE FOR CONCERN, BUT NOT ALARM 
While the Sino-Japanese relationship did look “ripe for rivalry” between 2001 and 
2005,38 closer inspection reveals that anti-Japanese nationalism is also constrained by 
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pragmatic decision making and a larger desire for economic prosperity.  The commonly 
held argument that xenophobic nationalism will lead to enduring rivalry can be either 
refuted or mitigated with counter-arguments that assert 1) historical enmity is actually 
shallow, 2) a seasoned media narrows the divide, 3) pragmatism trumps the emotion of 
territorial disputes, and 4) top-down influences of popular opinion can quell belligerent 
ultranationalist factions.   
1.  Historical Enmity is a Shallow Argument 
First of all, the complexity of the historical enmity argument requires that it be 
broken down into smaller segments.  From the Chinese perspective, Japan is easy to hate 
because of its insincere apologies, mistreatment of Chinese people, lack of reconciliation, 
and whitewashing of history.  Each of these arguments also has a Japanese perspective 
and counterarguments.  Japan often complains of “apology fatigue” because Prime 
Minister Murayama clearly apologized on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World 
War II to all Asian nations and Emperor Akihito, during his first state visit to China in 
1992, expressed his deep remorse to the people of China for enduring hardships at the 
hands of the Imperial Army.39  Regarding general cases of wartime mistreatment, Japan 
has hid behind the legal argument that punitive damages were already paid to 
governments when relations were normalized via the 1951 San Francisco Treaty and the 
1972 joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC.  However, 
regarding specific cases of compensation, non-governmental agencies with semi-
governmental support have established the Asian Women’s Fund to compensate comfort 
women and paid damages to the victim of the Qiqihar chemical weapons discovery.40  
Japan has worked with Chinese government officials to safely dispose of remaining 
canister of mustard gas in the Heilongjiang province.41   While it is true that Sino-
Japanese reconciliation pales in comparison to the Franco-German case, if reconciliation 
                                                 
39 Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003), 15. 
40 “Fund ends payment to comfort women,” BBC News, February 20, 2002; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1831172.stm (accessed September 13, 2007); “Japan to Pay 
$2.7 Million to Lethal Gas Leak Incident,” Xinhua News Agency, October 19, 2003. 
41 “Experts to Destroy Japan’s Chemical Weapons,” CCTV.com, November 9, 2003. 
 14
is looked at from a broader colonial lens, then there are precedents where nation-states 
have ignored past atrocities for the sake of the greater good.  Examples include bilateral 
ties between England and India, Netherlands and Africa, the Netherlands and Indonesia, 
and finally the United States and Native Americans.   
Finally, on the issue of whitewashing historical facts, every country, including 
China, distorts the historical record.  The Uighurs in Xinjiang and Llamaists in Tibet 
likely tell a different version of history than what is taught in Chinese history books.  The 
more significant question seems to be whether Japan’s distortion of history will lead it 
back down the road of militarism.  In a survey called the “Beijing Area Study” conducted 
in 2001-2003, Alastair Iain Johnston found that the Chinese perception of threat from 
“Japanese militarism” was a distant sixth behind the threats of Taiwan independence, 
domestic social unrest, U.S. military power, global problems, and global economic 
decline. 42   Two other interesting observations from that study data were that U.S. 
reporting on “rising Chinese nationalism” may have had a selection bias in selecting 
mostly (30 percent) young Chinese students as sources.  The second is that the more 
educated and traveled the respondents were, the less likely they were to consider the 
United States a threat.  Therefore, Chinese rising nationalism may have been 
misrepresented in the press and as Chinese society becomes more educated and traveled, 
there may be reason for cautious optimism that anti-Japanese nationalism may diminish 
over time. 
2. A Seasoned Media Narrows the Divide 
Susan Shirk’s point that the sensationalized media in China hamstring the 
Beijing’s foreign policy making is well taken, but there is also no reason to be pessimistic 
that the media will not improve and evolve into a more credible source for information 
over time.  As Chinese society becomes more educated and critical of its news sources, 
the effects of Chinese “yellow journalism” are likely to subside over time.  While the 
evolution of “yellow journalism” in the United States in the late 1890s is inherently 
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different than the sensationalistic media in China in the late 1990s, Beijing has taken 
some initial steps in preparation for the 2008 summer Olympic Games.  On October 18, 
2007, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games has promised to allow 
foreign media free and open access to the internet and freedom of movement.43  In fact 
the media could play a crucial role in a larger political opening of China to a democratic 
regime change.  If the media succumb to the pressures of ultra-nationalism, then they 
might become the propaganda arm for a new regime and exacerbate tensions with 
Washington and Tokyo.  However, a professionalized media that stays “above the fray” 
of domestic politics could potentially be the catalyst for democratic change and a truly 
free press in China. 
3. Pragmatism Trumps Emotion on Territorial Issues 
Territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands in both 1990 and 1996 were closely 
examined by Downs and Saunders.44  They found that despite vehement calls from 
Chinese nationalists and a joint letter from thirty-five PLA generals demanding stronger 
action, Beijing intervened with calculated pragmatism to quell the dispute. 45   In 
November 2004, when a Han-class submarine was apparently probing Japanese undersea 
detection capabilities, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in rare form apologized for 
“technical problems” with the PLAN submarine. 46   While ultra-nationalist elements 
undoubtedly exist within Chinese society, the current government is committed to 
positive future relations with Japan and is not ready to challenge the Japan-U.S. security 
alliance.  On October 30, 2007, Beijing stepped up its carrot and stick efforts to deter 
protestors from sailing to the disputed Senkaku Islands.47  The fact that authorities forced 
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the protestors to sign a written pledge not to sail again shows that Beijing is serious about 
improving relations with Japan.  Those judgments were echoed by Michael Green in 
testimony before congress, when he said “there is reason to expect that both Tokyo and 
Beijing will add more nuance and caution to their treatment of controversial historical 
and territorial issues over the coming months and that will contribute to a more stable 
equilibrium in their bilateral relationship.”48 
4. Top-Down Influences Can Channel Nationalism as a Positive Force 
for Unity 
The bottom-up argument about xenophobic nationalism certainly carries some 
weight, but the virulent nature of Chinese demonstrations needs to be put in perspective 
and perhaps anti-Japanese sentiment could even be unlearned.  The number and 
frequency of anti-Japanese public protests seem intense when looked at as a group, but 
when compared to the 58,000 “mass incidents” reported in 2003, they represent only a 
small fraction of pent up anger that Chinese society holds towards other aspects of its life 
“like environmental problems, wage disputes, social welfare problems, the restructuring 
of state-owned enterprises, and evictions.”49  As in 1986, student demonstrations are 
likely as much about bad cafeteria food, corruption, and inequality as they are about the 
organized protest of the day.  Allen Whiting reports that interviews after the 1986 
textbook protest showed that “more than anti-Japanese sentiment motivated the student 
demonstrators.”50  Given the larger picture, the anti-Japanese riots only represent a small 
portion of animosity in China and protests alone should not be used as a barometer to 
predict a worsening relationship, because students demonstrate their anger for a variety of 
reasons.   
According to Chinese scholars, the underlying cause for enmity towards Japan is 
based on myth-making from the central government during the 1980s political education 
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campaigns (PEC) that fostered unity within China by deflecting hatred outward toward 
Japan.51  Beijing learned that while anti-Japanese nationalism does create a sense of unity 
among the people, it also negatively affects its ability to maintain openness toward 
Japanese trade and investment.  Among Chinese government and business leaders, many 
have changed their tone and are advocating restraint and moderation in discussions about 
Japan.  A growing number of “moderate party leaders advocate a plan that acknowledges 
Japan’s contributions, Japan’s democratic and peaceful orientation in the second half of 
the 20th century.” 52  If anti-Japanese sentiment was learned in the 1980s PECs, then there 
exists the possibility that pro-Japanese sentiment could be re-learned if the central 
government wanted to embark on a propaganda campaign to show how the post-World 
War II Japanese have been helpful to Chinese economic growth and development.  In fact, 
some of that is already happening with the disclosure of official developmental assistance 
(ODA) projects funded with Japanese money getting more attention now, than they did in 
the 1980s and 1990s.53  
Prior to the Wen-Abe summit in April 2007, CCTV began to run stories with 
positive coverage of Japan.  In a special series on Japan, CCTV host Bai Yansong 
interviewed Tsuneo Watanabe, the chairman and editor in chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun, 
Japan’s largest newspaper.  Yansong asked about the Yomiuri Shimbun project to 
“determine who was responsible for the war” and inquired about Watanabe’s 
perspectives on the prime minister’s Yasukuni shrine visit.54  It was an unprecedented 
display of impartiality for an official Chinese news source.  The more surprising outcome 
was that only a few months after the positive coverage and Wen Jiabao’s summit in 
Tokyo, polls showed positive trends in terms the public’s perception of Japan.  The 
Genron NPO, a non-profit organization, conducted a joint public opinion survey in May 
2007 which found that there was a 20 percentage point improvement in Chinese 
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perceptions of Japan.55  If a couple months of positive propaganda can generate 20 points 
of improved perceptions, then public opinion may not be as ardently anti-Japanese as the 
pessimists may think. 
Even during the most fanatical attacks from ultranationalists, a moderate line 
began to emerge, which advocated “patriotism without jingoism.”  Defenders of prudent 
patriotism protected the right to offer opposing views by remonstrating “gang of four” 
methods and showing how extreme “left” methods are not what the Chinese of today 
should be grasping for as they move toward advancing their society.56  “Writing in the 
Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily), Sima Xin argued that the expression of patriotism must 
be ‘civilized not barbaric.’”57  As long as a contingent of open-minded people in China 
continue to advocate for a broad exchange of ideas, then in the not too distant future, 
optimists can hope that the emotion of Sino-Japanese relations will fade and interested 
observers will be able to have an open and rational conversation about Japan.  The hope 
of Ma Licheng and others is that China will be ready to embrace the concept of 
empowerment and relinquish the concept of victimization.  In hindsight, even the 
controversy over the Mori building was overblown.  The president of the Mori 
construction company put a positive spin on the completed $1.1 billion project saying 
“we were happy to make the change because it did not cause any real delays and it 
pleased the Shanghai authorities.”58   
While anti-Japanese nationalism certainly is cause for concern within the context 
of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, it is not a cause for alarm.  Perhaps a good test of 
this assertion would be a resurgence of anti-Japanese nationalism during the 2008 
summer Olympics in Beijing.  If a repeat of the 2004 Asian Cup protests were to occur, 
one could make the assertion that nationalism in China is still a significant factor in the 
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evolving diplomatic relationship.  However, if nothing happens, it does not necessarily 
mean that relations are friendly, but just that relations are retuning to more normal 
standard.  
D. POSITIVE TRENDS SIGNALING CONVERGENCE 
Since the summer of 2006, political rhetoric between China and Japan began to 
soften and a long awaited opening began.  Positive trends are visible in both countries 
and Track II (semi-governmental) and Track III (non-governmental) programs of 
friendship and amity continue to foster positive results.   
1. Positive Trends in Japan 
While Prime Minister Koizumi got credit for implementing difficult economic 
reforms in Japan, he also took much criticism for his foreign policy towards China.  By 
the end of his term in office he received calls from seven former prime ministers and 
countless public admonitions from business leaders to stop visiting the Yasukuni 
shrine.59  When Prime Minister Abe took office, his “no confirmation, no denial” policy 
on Yasukuni shrine visits enabled him to make his first state visit to China, thus breaking 
the ice.  According to Japanese polling data, “an overwhelming 82 percent surveyed said 
that the next Prime Minister should not visit Yasukuni, while only 10 percent supported 
the continued homage.”60 
While anti-Chinese nationalism does exist in Japan, those elements of society 
represent a small minority with little political clout.  Japanese generally associate ultra-
nationalists with the “yakuza” criminal element and Japan’s National Police Agency 
monitors 500 different right-wing groups (uyoku dantai) and estimates that their numbers 
do not exceed 10,000 members.61  A recent headline grabbing action from the ultra-
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nationalists was the burning of Koichi Kato’s home for criticizing Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.  However shortly after the incident, the leader of 
the right-wing group responsible for the arsonist, told police authorities that he was 
disbanding his organization.62  The desperate measures taken by these right-wing groups 
are often interpreted as a reflection of its lack of mainstream Japanese political influence.  
Some analysts presume that Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine demonstrate his 
right-leaning nationalistic tendencies, but other analyses attribute his homage to his 
personal views on praying for the war dead.63  
The recent election of Yasuo Fukuda, the eldest son of former Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda, a pro-China statesman, will likely bode well for improved diplomatic 
relations.  The Fukuda faction in Japanese domestic politics has always taken a soft 
approach towards China.64  Yasuo Fukuda has already announced that he does not intend 
to pay homage to the Yasukuni Shrine and even suggested that the Yasukuni issue be 
removed by building a separate war memorial.65  In order to placate Chinese desires 
Fukuda has even decided not to recognize the Dalai Lama as a VIP.  Pema Gyalpo, a 
former representative of the Dalai Lama and professor at Torin University in Yokohama 
commented that "among the democratic nations, Japan is the only one that refused to 
meet His Holiness."66  On November 30, 2007, Japan and China held their first ever 
ministerial-level economic dialogue in Beijing, where Japanese Foreign Minister 
Masahiko Komura met with Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan.67  On December 27, 
2007, Prime Minister Fukuda kept his promise to pay an official visit to Beijing by the 
end of 2008.  Hu Jintao personally ensured a warm reception especially since Fukuda’s 
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announcement not to support Taiwan’s planned referendum to join the United Nations 
saying “if the referendum holds the possibility of Taipei unilaterally changing the status 
quo, I can’t support it.”68  This change of China policy within the Liberal Democratic 
Party presents an opportunity for the diplomatic pendulum to swing back towards the 
optimists again. 
2. Positive Trends in China 
The normally cautious Hu Jintao administration has opened up to cooperation 
with Tokyo with multiple good will visits and an increasingly moderate diplomatic tone.  
Even though anti-Japanese websites and comics still exist in Chinese subculture, 
mainstream news sources have downplayed anti-Japanese news articles.  A survey of the 
Open Source Center news timeline since 2006 has shown an absence of reports on anti-
Japanese nationalism, where it averaged dozens of articles per year in the period between 
2001-2006.  In fact, news reports show a concerted effort from the central government to 
mute potential flare ups aimed at Japan.  The central government censored the movie 
“Memoirs of a Geisha” because the lead character, portrayed by a Chinese actress, could 
be construed as a prostitute and censors were concerned the film might reignite anti-
Japanese sentiment.69  Regarding Prime Minister Abe’s potentially nationalistic visit with 
Judge Radhabinod Pal’s son in India, the Chinese Foreign Ministry commented rather 
mutedly that “the international community has reached its final conclusion on this issue a 
long time ago.”70 
Good will visits from the Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan in August 2007 and 
top political advisor Jia Qinglin in September 2007 are keeping Sino-Japanese relations 
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in a positive light and helping to shape public opinion.71  The Nikkei Shimbun reports that 
planning has begun for a Hu Jintao visit to Tokyo in the spring of 2008. 72  As the post-
Cold War East Asian structure adjusts, these visits may be indicators that China intends 
to embrace Japan’s technological advances in energy conservation, pollution control and 
nuclear energy production as a part of its grand strategy for peaceful development.  A 
couple of litmus tests regarding China’s diplomatic strategy toward Japan would be a 
continued decrease in provocative military actions and the continued positive polling data 
on Chinese impressions of Japan. 
3. Positive Trends on Track II and Track III Efforts  
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that the flow of cultural exchange is 
increasing in all major categories.  In particular, the Japan-China 21st Century Friendship 
Program, mainly consisting of high school students was launched in 2006, to promote 
exchanges among the youth.  In the first year of the program, approximately 1,200 
Chinese high school students were invited to Japan, where they deepened their 
understanding of Japan through school visits and stays with Japanese families.  About 
150 Japanese students went to China at the invitation of the Chinese side.73  Other 
categories are also showing increases from previous years in terms of cross-country 
vocational study, bilateral travel, and visa applications.74  While often under reported and 
overlooked by journalists, there have been consistent efforts from both Japan and China 
to build closer bonds of friendship.   
Encouraging reports are also surfacing from the Jamestown Foundation that “the 
Chinese leadership was aware that China’s continued economic development depended 
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upon both Japanese investments as well as stable relations with the regional powers.”75  
Scholars from the United States and other parts of the world have been engaged on the 
topic of Sino-Japanese rivalry with workshops being established at the Australian 
National University in 2006, the University of Victoria and the University of Alberta in 
Canada in 2007, and Uppsala University in Stockholm and Keio University in 2007.76  
While ultra-nationalists’ mindsets will not likely change soon, these bonds of cultural 
understanding may one day grow into the mainstream and positively affect the 
perspectives of future generations. 
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
Anti-Japanese sentiments in China are real, but so are the feelings of amity and 
cooperation.  While the negative aspects of anti-Japanese nationalism are constrained by 
diplomatic pragmatism and economic interdependence, examples like the last minute 
redesign of the Mori building and the cancelled Shanghai-Beijing bullet train demonstrate 
the pessimistic view that anti-Japanese nationalism constrains closer economic ties.  
Despite his best intentions, former Prime Minister Koizumi’s foreign policy toward 
China failed causing a period of severe isolation from Beijing.  During this period (2001-
2005), diplomatic relations drifted towards the doomsayer end of the Rozman spectrum.  
However, the upcoming state visit of Hu Jintao to Japan and the more dovish Japanese 
prime minister would indicate that a shift towards the optimists should be expected in the 
near-term.  However, the long-term projections for Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations are 
for more of the same.  Politicians will likely continue their cautious approach to each 
other because of the political risk associated with alienating the “hawks” within their 
domestic polity.  Thus, diplomatic relations will likely stay the course with only half-
hearted attempts to ameliorate the significant political differences. 
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Rather than Michael Green’s prediction of stable equilibrium, the author expects 
bounded fluctuations in diplomatic relations that will vary depending on the tension 
between the centripetal forces of economic interdependence and the centrifugal forces of 
anti-Japanese nationalism.  However, a potential wild card that could upset the dynamics 
of this relationship is the nationalistic impulses that could potentially emerge if China 




III. ECONOMIC ISSUES:  DOES INTERDEPENDENCE LEAD TO 
COOPERATION? 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Given the existing levels of historical animosity and political distrust between 
these regional powers, it would be improbable to expect a close friendship or an alliance 
to develop between Japan and China within the next decade.  However, because of the 
pressures of global markets and economic interdependence, one might expect more 
diplomatic and security cooperation than what exists today.  The rules of the twenty-first 
century “great game” have changed international relations and created “complex 
interdependencies” between all nation-states.77  Modern world powers need an educated 
labor force, robust capital markets, and peaceful development, not territorial expansion 
and the benefits of military dominance are on the decline.78  Astute scholars, like Michael 
Yahuda, suggest there are limits to the liberal international relations theory that asserts 
interdependence can lead to cooperation.79  More specifically, this section examines the 
causal relationship between Sino-Japanese economic interdependence and security 
cooperation analyzed in four steps (and parts) as illustrated in figure 1.   
1.  The Framework 
The first part evaluates the interdependencies of both economies in order to 
calculate the cost of conflict.  The second part looks at trade, investment, financial 
integration, and aid to determine whether interdependencies actually do lead to increased 
empathy.  The third part provides one example where interdependencies did lead to 
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diplomatic cooperation.  The fourth part explores other factors affecting Sino-Japanese 
security cooperation besides just economic interdependency.  Finally, the last part 
concludes with an assessment of the challenges facing each economy in the next twenty 
years. 
 
Figure 1.   Interdependence-Empathy Hypothesis 
B.  ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: THE COST OF CONFLICT 
Economic interdependence is generally measured in terms of trade and investment.  
Hence, the opportunity cost of a Sino-Japanese conflict could be measured in terms of 
lost trade and investment due to a political decision to sever relations with each other.  
Isolation from the U.S. and Japanese markets alone would cost China about 25 percent of 
its total trade and 75 percent of its total inward foreign direct investment (FDI).  
European and other Asian nations may be reluctant to trade and invest in a conflict zone 
for several years, so China’s economy would be thrown back to the Korean War era, 
where it was isolated and weak.  While the Chinese are resilient people, the resulting 
economic implosion would cause massive unemployment and social unrest, making CCP 
regime survival iffy at best.   
In 2006, Sino-Japanese trade exceeded $200B making China Japan’s largest 
trading partner representing about 20 percent of Japan’s total trade.80  The Japanese 
economic recovery since 2003 is largely based on profits from Japanese companies in 
China, which if lost, would send the Japanese economy into a tailspin.  Assuming at least 
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a five year period before economic relations were re-established, the direct cost of 
conflict would be in the trillions of dollars, with the indirect costs to the region likely 
approaching the tens of trillions of dollars resulting in a global recession and even 
perhaps a depression in the entire East Asia region.  However, just because the cost of 
conflict is so high, does it correspond to increased empathy? 
C.  INTERDEPENDENCY AND EMPATHY 
Empathy is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as identification with 
and understanding of another’s situation, feelings, and motives.  While both sides might 
understand each other’s motivation to not engage in a costly conflict, it is still a 
conceptual leap of faith to expect a common understanding about finance to carry over 
into empathy in other areas like politics or security concerns.  Even though trade, 
investment, and financial integration seem to be deepening, a closer look shows that these 
ties also have drawbacks that constrain both diplomatic and security cooperation.   
1. Sino-Japanese Trade Trends 
In 2006, China surpassed the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner, but 
this close relationship, which has mostly been described as complementary, has also been 
fraught with friction.  In the early 1980s trade frictions grew with China because of a 
perception that Japan was exploiting Chinese workers, holding back on technology 
transfers and profiting from unfair trade practices.  Trade wars erupted over agricultural 
imports and car exports.  Japanese analysts are quick to warn that the complementary 
nature of the trade relationship could be short lived.  Today, Japan exports steel and semi-
conductors to China, while China exports mostly textiles and inexpensive manufactured 
electronics back to Japan, but concerns about a “hollowing out” of the manufacturing 
sectors are forcing businesses to question the practice of off-shoring their factories.81  If 
Japan does not migrate to the service sector where it enjoys a comparative advantage of 
highly skilled labor, it will compete head-to-head with China which has a comparative 
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advantage in low-cost labor.  In addition, realists are quick to remind liberal advocates of 
economic interdependence that prior to 1914 robust trade between England and Germany 
did not prevent World War I. 
2. FDI Trends 
In 2005, foreign direct investment from Japan reached $28B, which accounted for 
over 50 percent of inward investment for China, but concerns over technology transfers 
and long-term loyalty have caused Japanese firms to shift to a “China plus one” 
investment strategy.82  Since the anti-Japanese riots in 2005, Japanese investment trends 
to China are declining and trends towards Southeast Asia and India are increasing.  The 
graph in figure 2 shows that FDI investment for domestic sales have dropped off in 2005. 
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Figure 2.   FDI Trends from Japan to China83 
In addition, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) is concerned about 
the potential lifting of favorable contract laws in China’s special economic zones.84  Even 
a small change in the taxation legislation could easily turn a profitable investment into a 
losing proposition. 
3.  Financial Integration and Foreign Exchange Trends 
The level of financial integration also appears much deeper especially after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC).  According to Ming Wan, “the AFC strengthened not 
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weakened the region’s interest in economic cooperation.”85 However, a closer look at the 
Asian Developmental Bank and the Chiang Mai Initiative, show that the roots of 
cooperation have not spread to the political arena.  These initiatives basically prevent 
hedge-fund speculators from mounting another attack on an Asian currency, like what 
precipitated the Thai baht crisis in 1997.  In addition, both Japan and China have bet on 
the U.S. dollar to provide macro-economic stability and have accumulated unprecedented 
holdings of U.S. debt with foreign exchange reaching over $1.3 trillion in China and 
$895 million in Japan.86  However, just because their economic future relies a healthy 
U.S. dollar does not mean that they are dependent on each other’s economic stability.  
Assuming that the economic interdependence link to empathy is weak, perhaps economic 
incentives might be a better way to create understanding for another’s situation, feelings, 
and motives.   
4.  Japanese Aid as an Economic Strategic Tool? 
Through a program called official developmental assistance (ODA) Japan has 
provided low-interest loans and grants to China starting in 1979 totaling nearly $30B 
over the course of 29 years.  Japan is the world’s single largest donor country of ODA 
and has to some extent bought good will.  According to a 2006 BBC World Service poll, 
Japan was most widely viewed as having a positive influence on the world, with 31 of 33 
countries giving a positive rating.87  The two countries that did not respond favorably 
were China and South Korea, demonstrating that economic incentives do have limits. 
Can Japanese economic aid be used as a strategic tool to compel China to its will?  
On May 15, 1995, despite Japanese diplomatic pleas for a moratorium, China conducted 
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its 42nd underground nuclear test at Lop Nor.88  Tokyo threatened to hold back the low-
interest loans promised to Beijing.  Beijing rebuked the threat, saying that the ODA was 
owed to the Chinese people because war reparations were never paid.  Tokyo relented 
and only held back $75M and the Chinese completed their testing in August and 
September of 1995 and finally signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty on July 30, 
1996.89  In the case of the Chinese 1995 and 1996 nuclear testing, it would seem that 
economic incentives were ineffectual as an economic tool to punish bad behavior.  In 
general, economic interdependence between Tokyo and Beijing has not led to increased 
empathy nor has it bought “good will.”  
D. ENVIRONMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
While the argument for economic interdependence may be weak, the fact that 
Japan is geographically down wind from China makes these countries also 
environmentally interdependent.  China’s poor environmental record has the potential to 
ruin the air in and the oceans surrounding Japan.  In addition, the mismanagement of 
nuclear power generation facilities could endanger Japan with the threat of Chernobyl-
like nuclear fallout.  Even though Japan has voted to discontinue ODA in 2008 for low 
interest lows to China, Japan sees it in its best interest to continue to provide grant money 
to key projects, like environmental problems and nuclear safety. 90   The ecological 
concerns stem from the acid rain and photochemical smog that plagues southern Japan.91  
These concerns have compelled Japanese leaders to put the resolution of environmental 
issues at the center of their China strategy of building a strategic partnership.92  These 
thoughts were first espoused by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in his September 5, 
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1997 speech in Beijing, entitled “Japan-China Relations in the New Age: New 
Developments in Dialogue and Cooperation.”93   
E.  PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY COOPERATION 
Why is there a difference between economic interdependence and environmental 
interdependence?  The author postulates that the reason that environmental cooperation 
does spill over into the diplomatic field is because the risk tolerance and mindset of the 
individual decision makers are the same.  Business-minded entrepreneurs are motivated 
by potential profits or best case scenarios, whereas defense specialists are concerned 
about worst case scenarios.  Politicians in a democratic society are motivated by popular 
opinion and need to be able to articulate to a domestic audience the reasons behind their 
policy decisions.  Close economic ties directly impact only a small sector of society, 
while the negative impacts of environmental problems affect a larger audience.  Hence, 
the threat of poisonous smog choking the innocent resonates with voters helping to 
change an uncooperative predisposition to one of cooperation.  The concept of energy 
and environmental cooperation resonates in China as well.  While on a good will tour of 
Japan, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 
said that “China will learn the advanced technologies and successful experiences from 
Japan in the fields of energy-saving and environmental protection.”94 
Can the combination of economic and environmental interdependencies guarantee 
peace and the absence of military conflict?  Scholarly studies on the linkages of 
economics and security in East Asia have shown them to be relatively weak.95  Using the 
analogy of a mugger threatening a victim at knife point saying “your money or your life,” 
it is relatively easy to understand that victims will usually choose to spare their own lives 
(i.e. regime survival).  In addition, economic policy coordination is complex and 
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compartmentalized.  The same applies to security policy with the additional restriction 
that much of the information is sensitive and classified.  Hence, increased cooperation on 
the economic front does not readily translate to increased cooperation on the security 
front.  In that context, it is completely reasonable to expect minor skirmishes to occur, as 
militaries test the limits of their capabilities.  Politicians, too, would likely condone minor 
conflicts as long as they were confident limited military actions would not escalate nor 
negatively affect economic relations.   
While security guarantees are not likely, there is no reason to be overly 
pessimistic, either.  As long as the economic gains outweigh the domestic losses in the 
“great game” of globalization, neither side it going to purposely topple the international 
order or the East Asian Economic infrastructure.  The thin veneer of environmental 
interdependence can serve as a core common interest to a Sino-Japanese diplomatic 
approach to build a strategic partnership.   
Other factors to calculate into the security cooperation equation are the U.S. 
military capabilities, potential flare ups in the Taiwan straits, and energy security 
concerns.  The U.S.-Japan alliance dominates the East Asian security context with a U.S. 
military presence at forward deployed bases and second strike nuclear capabilities.  The 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) mandates that the United States support the Taiwanese 
military with weapon systems designed to keep parity with the mainland forces, which 
serves as another structural wedge preventing closer Sino-Japanese security cooperation.  
However, the Taiwan problem might become moot as “China’s and Taiwan’s mutual 
WTO membership further cross-strait economic integration and decrease tensions 
between the two sides.”96   
Finally, energy security also plays into the overall strategic calculus.  The Chinese 
“Malacca dilemma” does present a temporary sense of dependence on the U.S. Navy for 
protection of the sea lanes of communication that protect oil imports from the Middle 
East.  Given that both China and Japan are dependent the benevolence of the United 
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States for their energy security, they will likely be “locked in” to a static security 
relationship for at least the next two decades. 
F. CHALLENGES FOR CHINA-JAPAN IN 2027 
July 7th, 2027 will mark the ninetieth anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge 
incident, in which the Japanese initiated the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).  
Will the Chinese still hate the Japanese in 2027?  Liberal international relations theorists 
would say that depends on the Chinese economic situation.  If China were able to 
overcome the challenges of an aging population, the lack of a social security net, blatant 
environmental pollution, and endemic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) corruption, then 
the CCP might feel that it is on its way to becoming more than a regional power.  The 
predictions from a Goldman Sachs report in 2003 are optimistic and based on models that 
factor in growth in employment (ages 15-60), growth in capital stock, and the total-factor 
productivity (TFP).  These models are based on the assumption that the country can 
maintain macro economic stability, efficient institutions (that do not waste government 
funds), openness to trade and FDI, and increasing education levels for its population.97  
China has been doing extremely well on three of the four assumptions, but suffers from 
inefficient legal, social welfare, and environmental institutions.  Tackling the corruption 
issue from within could prove to be difficult given China’s track record of local officials 
ignoring prescribed policy initiatives and absconding government funds.98  If additional 
government funds are diverted from economic investment to social welfare and fixing 
environmental problems, then China’s growth could become derailed.  A significant 
source of inefficiency for China could manifest itself in terms of food and (fresh) water 
security.  A gloomy outlook on the agricultural sector predicts that China’s inability to 
feed its own population could put a strain on global grain supplies.99  Food and water 
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shortages could potentially divert precious national resources to the import of grains and 
basic food stuffs that are more efficiently produced within its own borders.100   As 
China’s arable farmland decreases and its population increases its appetite for meat, an 
unbiased OECD study predicts that China’s net grain imports will grow to about 43 
million metric tons in 2010, about one tenth the world’s supply, which will still affect 
world market prices. 101   In addition, the worsening environmental malaise has the 
potential to seriously erode TFP growth and capital stocks, as well.  Lost productivity due 
to illness and increased capital costs required to establish a clean working environment 
could potentially divert investment elsewhere.102   
Japanese competitiveness in 2027 will be affected by a graying and shrinking 
population, an inefficient domestic economy, and a lethargic governmental reform 
program.  Although the Japanese economy has shown signs of resuscitating itself from a 
decade-long recession, the Economist says that there is still a long way to go before the 
economy can experience sustained growth.103  A Deutsche Bank Research study cites 
that Japan’s population has been declining since 2005 and the xenophobic nature of 
“island nation” politics makes increased immigration an unlikely response to a shrinking 
labor force.104  Although Japan is one of the most educated societies in the world, it is yet 
unclear if education translates directly into innovation, which is what businesses need to 
remain competitive in the increasingly service-oriented world market.  Based on reports 
about a growing “not in employment, education or training” (NEET) population in Japan, 
analysts are concerned that the younger generations do not possess the same “work ethic” 
as previous generation of workers.105  A second concern is the huge inefficiency with the 
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Japanese domestic market.  Compromising over 80 percent of the GDP, the domestic 
market needs to be reformed to better use the labor and capital within its borders.106  
Finally, financial reforms are needed to bring the balance sheets back into order.   Having 
once been the largest creditor country in the region Japan now carries a debt worth 150% 
percent of GDP.  The debt needs to be brought under control by increasing government 
revenues (i.e., raising the consumption tax) and reducing government spending.  Japan’s 
competitiveness in 2027 will depend largely on its ability to increase government 
revenues and produce more with a smaller workforce.   
Even though economic predictions are far from reliable, on the whole, analysts 
view China’s “feel the stones as one crosses the river” approach to reform as beneficial 
for long-term growth, while the Japanese tendency to resist policy reform is an indication 
of poor future economic performance, which would give China the upper hand in the race 
to 2027.   
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The Asia-Pacific region has been relatively quick (compared to Latin America 
and Africa) to learn that comprehensive national power is inextricably linked to economic 
power, which is linked to openness to global trade and a stable security environment.  
More specifically, Tokyo and Beijing have the precarious task of managing a complex 
diplomatic relationship that effect and is affected by the economic and security 
relationship.  This chapter sought to develop the links between economic interdependence 
and security cooperation.  However, the results are that while economic interdependence 
does increase the costs of conflict, it is certainly not a guarantee for peace.  In most cases, 
economic interdependence did not lead to empathy in either diplomatic or security circles.  
The main reasons for this are that the risk tolerance and decision making priorities for the 
individuals involved are uniquely different.  However, environmental interdependence 
does show promise as an area from which a robust bilateral relationship could be built.  
While there may not be a link from economic cooperation to security cooperation, 
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security cooperation continues for other reasons like energy security and the protection of 
alliance relationships.  Finally, an analysis of Sino-Japanese economic prospects for the 
next 20 years shows that China may have the upper hand, which would significantly alter 
the current status quo of East Asian economic powers.  So, if the conclusions of this 
hypothesis hold true, the economic rise of China should not  
lead to a dramatic change in either the diplomatic or security relationship.  Hence, both 
Japan and China will adjust economically, but there would be little spill over into the 
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IV. SECURITY ISSUES: MILITARY AND ENERGY STRATEGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For the purposes of this chapter, Sino-Japanese security issues encompass both 
military and energy security, defined as measures taken to ensure sovereignty of 
territorial borders and access to the energy that fuels the economy.  In fact, scholars such 
as Jitsuo Terashima of the Mitsui Bussan Strategic Research Center argue that military 
and energy strategy should be inextricably linked due to their relevance to national 
interests.107  The former undersecretary of defense Joseph Nye once said “security is like 
oxygen – you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is 
nothing else that you will think about more.”108  In the twenty-first century, with the 
growing concerns regarding the effects of “peak oil” on continued economic growth, it is 
not surprising that access to fossil fuels and the clean development of electrical power 
often frame the debate over military strategy.  The underlying questions this chapter 
seeks to address are two fold – 1) what is the likelihood that a “security dilemma” will 
emerge in the region, and 2) what are the salient security issues for the bilateral 
relationship in the next five to ten years.  Finally, the chapter provides some conclusions 
about where the Sino-Japanese security relationship is headed. 
1. The Framework 
In order to answer the first question on the probability of a “security dilemma” 
emerging in the region, the first four parts provide a military assessment on both the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
and address the security related problems and disputes, namely the ongoing rift over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands and Taiwan as they relate to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  
The military assessments will explore the capabilities (in terms of nuclear, conventional, 
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and asymmetric potentialities), the perceived strategic goals, and implications for each 
country.  The next five parts focus on energy security and attempt to put a positive spin 
on the potential for cooperation in overcoming the challenges in the bilateral relationship.  
These topics include the territorial dispute over the East China Sea natural gas and oil 
resources, the cooperation with Beijing in developing both nuclear energy and energy 
conservation programs, and the potential collaboration with Russian and other energy 
rich countries.  The last two parts assess the strategic implications of energy security and 
evaluate the military to military relations. 
B. MILITARY ASSESSMENT 
1. The Chinese Military Assessment 
Deriving an accurate assessment of the PLA is challenging due to the low levels 
of transparency and high levels of deception surrounding China’s defense capabilities.  
However, PLA published defense white papers and scholarly analysis of the PLA does 
allow for an educated guess on China’s military capability.  China tested its first nuclear 
weapon in 1964, joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and signed 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.  China has the largest standing 
military in the world with 2.3 million and a defense budget estimated at $44.9 billion, an 
increase of 17.8 percent over the 2006 budget and the largest increase in five years.109 
The PLA strongest levers of military power over the JSDF are the 2nd Artillery’s 
strategic assets.  According to international security organizations, the 2nd Artillery 
possesses 22 inter-continental ballistic missiles, supposedly aimed at the United States or 
Russia, and 770 intermediate and short range ballistic missiles, reportedly aimed at 
Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan.110  Japanese defense officials have taken notice of these 
missiles and efforts to improve their guidance systems.  The seeds of ideological mistrust 
                                                 
109 Jim Yardley and David Lague, “Beijing Increases Defense Spending,” International Herald 
Tribune, March 4, 2007, http:///www.iht.com/arrticles/2007/03/05/asia/web-0305military.php, (accessed 
June 10, 2007). 
110 Institute of International and Strategic Studies (London, UK), The Military Balance, 2004/5 and 
2006. 
 41
were sewn at the beginning of the Cold War with the seemingly belligerent actions of 
shelling of the Taiwanese islands of Matsu and Quemoy in 1954 and 1958.  In February 
1995, China’s military occupation of the Mischief Reef heightened concern about 
potential conflict with Beijing.  However, the July 1995 missile exercise and ensuing 
March 1996 missile crisis showed that post-Cold War conflict could potentially entangle 
Japan in a larger U.S.-China conflict, which made both Japanese conservatives and 
liberals wary of Chinese strategic aims.   
In addition to the nuclear threat, the PLA Navy (PLAN) submarine fleet and 
China’s military modernization program have alarmed several high-level U.S. officials.  
Off the coast of Okinawa on November 10th 2006, a Chinese “quiet” diesel Kilo-class 
submarine shadowed a U.S. aircraft carrier -- increasing tensions and potentially risking a 
military confrontation, said U.S. Pacific Forces commander, William J. Fallon. 111  
President Hu Jintao refers to the vulnerability of China’s oil supply lines from the Middle 
East and Africa as the “Malacca Dilemma.”  China’s growing military spending and 
apparent pursuit of maritime power projection capabilities has elicited a watchful 
response from both Japan and U.S. China-watchers forewarning of a growing potential 
for a zero-sum competition in the region.112  Director of National Intelligence John D. 
Negroponte prescribed vigilance regarding China’s military ambitions before the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence on February 2, 2006, warning that “China’s military is 
vigorously pursuing a modernization program: a full suite of modern weapons and 
hardware for a large proportion of its overall force structure; designs for a more effective 
operational doctrine at the tactical and theater level; training reforms; and wide-ranging 
improvements in logistics, administration, financial management, mobilization, and other 
critical support functions.” 113   China’s increased wealth has “fueled a military  
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modernization program that has steadily increased Beijing’s force projection 
capabilities,” and the country “may become a peer competitor to the United States at 
some point.”114   
What are Beijing’s intentions regarding the PLA?  That question is best answered 
by examining capabilities and investments.  The current defense strategy – “local wars 
under conditions of informatization” – means that the PLA is acquiring weapons that may 
be used both for defensive and offensive purposes.  Weapon system procurements seem 
to be aimed at specific war zones, like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.  The PLA 
is acquiring naval and air projection capabilities like the nuclear submarines and in-flight 
refueling, but procurement budgets are constrained and the military-industrial complex 
will have difficulty closing the technology gap with Japan and the West.115  Despite a 
downsizing since 1998, the PLA’s personnel costs still account for nearly 40-50 percent 
of its budget and maintenance costs are increasing, leaving indigenous research and 
development to be funded with extrabudgetary revenues. 116   Therefore, the PLA’s 
procurement strategy leverages technologies like information warfare and quiet 
submarines that produce significant effects without a considerable amount of investment.  
While the PLA’s asymmetric capabilities are improving, its level of actual combat 
experience is remarkably low.  Two weeks in 1979, when the PLA were driven back by a 
smaller North Vietnamese force, represents its most recent combat experience.  Since the 
conventional force has large capability gaps and limited resources, the ongoing revolution 
in military affairs (RMA) is most likely a euphemism for a phased transformation process, 
where only a small portion of elite forces are given the training and resources to truly 
modernize.117   
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What does this mean for Japan?  Until such time that the PLA can achieve a truly 
capable military, it will continue to emphasize the “perception of power,” avoid a direct 
confrontation with the U.S-Japan alliance, and use diplomatic channels to constrain the 
expansion of Japanese military power.  International calls for more transparency have 
resulted in the PLA publishing defense white papers since 1998, which have helped to 
diffuse the emergence of a conventional arms race in the region.  Despite the PLA’s 
double-digit increases in defense spending, the JSDF has remained fixed at 1 percent of 
GDP, which is an indicator that the security dilemma has not yet emerged. 
2. The Japanese Military Assessment 
The civilian controlled JSDF is much more transparent and easier to understand, 
since much of the organizational structure was directly adopted from the U.S. military in 
the 1950s, but Japan’s “peace constitution” introduces nuances unique to Japan’s military.  
Even though Japan and China are the strongest military powers in northeast Asia, Japan’s 
post-World War II alliance with the United States complicates any kind of an “apples to 
apples” comparison to the PLA.  Japan renounced nuclear weapons and formally adopted 
the “three non-nuclear” principles in 1971 and it ratified the NPT in 1976 and the CTBT 
in 1997.  Japan has the twenty-first largest standing military in the world with 0.23 
million and the fourth largest defense budget at about $40 billion.118 
Despite the PLA’s relative strength in size and arms compared to the JSDF, 
Chinese leaders are wary of any indication that the “cork will come off the bottle” and 
Japanese militarism will once again become resurgent.119  The Chinese definition of a 
peaceful Japan is one that strictly adheres to the “renouncement of war as a sovereign 
right” clause in the constitution.  From the Chinese perspective, Japan would overstep 
constitutional boundaries if and when it ever interpreted the constitution to allow for the 
possession and use of nuclear weapons; militarized space with dual-use observation and 
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communications satellites; supported U.S. rear area operations; acquired any offensive 
power-projection weapon systems; and especially engaged in overseas military 
operations.  By keeping the JSDF “boxed in,” not only are Chinese fears of Japanese 
militarism contained, it also ensures that Japan’s regional influence is bottled up, 
especially regarding Taiwan and the sea lanes traversing the South China Sea. 
The Chinese view of the U.S.-Japan alliance has come full-circle based on the 
perceived motivations of the alliance.  After the communist victory over Chiang Kai-
shek’s ROC, the PRC demonized Japan as “imperialist dogs.”  However, after the Sino-
Soviet split and the 1969 border conflicts, the PRC “opened” to the United States in 1972 
and supported the U.S.-Japan alliance, as it kept Japanese rearmament in check.  Then, 
after the end of the Cold War, the PRC once again viewed the alliance as a means to 
contain a rising China.  Chinese analysts point to the following indicators of a maturing 
U.S.-Japan alliance as evidence of a deliberate “containment” policy.  First, the Chinese 
perceive the September 1997 new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation as U.S. 
encouragement for Japan’s constitutional reform to allow for collective defense.  The 
new guidelines set the precedent for greater JSDF support in rear area operations, sharing 
of intelligence information, and cooperation in the projection of U.S. power from 
Japanese bases.  Second, the Chinese are keenly aware of Japanese efforts to develop an 
indigenous space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.  From 
Tanegashima Space Center, a field center of the National Space Development Agency 
(NASDA), two earth observing satellites have been launched that carry sensors that can 
detect 2.5 meter objects on earth and orbit over the Asia-Pacific region.120  Despite the 
fact that Japan claims these satellites were launched in response to the North Korean 
nuclear missile threat, the Chinese view these spy satellites as a violation of the 1969 
NASDA regulations that prohibit the militarization of space for early warning missile 
defense purposes.121   
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Lastly, China’s gravest security concern is Japan’s abandonment of its non-
nuclear principles.  Chinese alarm bells were ringing when former Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed the idea to consider developing nuclear weapons.122  These 
calls exacerbate Chinese concerns because Japan has announced plans to build a fast-
breeder reactor that can reprocess spent uranium and manufacture weapons grade 
plutonium.  Currently, the United States vehemently objects to North Korea and Iran 
possessing both uranium enriching and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities, but has been 
complicit in allowing Japan to obtain both, which constitute a full nuclear fuel cycle. 
3. Nuclear Arms Race? 
The potential for a nuclear arms race cannot be disregarded offhand.  Both China 
and North Korea pose a significant threat to Japan.  Even though Japan has the raw 
material and technical capability to put a warhead on a missile, several normative, 
political, and practical reasons prevent Japan from becoming a nuclear weapons state.  
The after shock of living with nuclear fallout at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki has created 
a popular anti-nuclear movement within Japan.  It is not uncommon for the mayor of 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki to lead international anti-nuclear movements.  Politically, Japan 
faces opposition from its allies and Asian neighbors who loathe a nuclear armed Japan.  
Lastly, because Japan is so dependent on nuclear power, breaking away from the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime would cut off its civilian nuclear energy program from the 
international community. 
Given these constraints, it is highly unlikely Japan’s nuclear energy program will 
ever be linked to the development of nuclear weapons in the near future.  However, the 
fact that Japan has a robust energy capability gives it extra leverage in dealing with China.  
From the Japanese perspective, limited access to natural resources of raw uranium means 
that self-sufficiency is of utmost importance.  The plutonium fuel fabrication facilities at 
the disputed Rokkasho village site can reprocess the spent uranium into a mixed-oxide 
fuel that can then be partially reused in a fast-breeder reactor, essentially reusing its 
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limited uranium resources.123  Japan’s ability to indigenously produce plutonium troubles 
nuclear non-proliferation regime experts because it creates a double standard for Japan.  
Tokyo is aware of the concern, but points to its transparency, trustworthiness, and 
membership in the nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to allay fears.  In fact, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not solely rely on trust, because it 
spends 30 percent of it inspection budget on monitoring and surveillance at the Rokkasho 
village site.124  However, international nuclear energy experts still question the need for 
Japan to develop a fast-breeder reactor at a cost which has amounted to 2,190 billion yen, 
nearly three times the original budget, and the estimated future cost of the reprocessing 
itself is at 19 trillion yen for 40 years.125 Therefore, Japan’s insistence to continue to 
develop at fast breeder reactor despite objections based on cost, necessity, and non-
proliferation issues stirs unrest among its Chinese neighbors.   
What are the implications on a potential arms race with China?  In the near term, 
Japan will continue to build capabilities designed to thwart the North Korean missile 
threat and China will continue to agitate against those dual-use capabilities.  As long as 
Japan lacks an offensive missile capability, the PLA will likely remain ambivalent 
towards the JSDF’s military modernization efforts. 
4. Problems and Disputes 
a. The Taiwan Problem 
The Taiwan problem has plagued Sino-U.S. relations since the Korean 
War and consequently it has been a continuous source of concern.  China’s vexation on 
Taiwan appears on two levels – the military capability of defending Taiwan and the 
political arrogance of intervening in internal Chinese affairs.  The controversy about 
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Japan’s military capability arises from the definition of the security perimeter.  The 1997 
U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines had ambiguous language that said that Japan would 
provide facilities and rear area support for U.S. operations in Japan’s “surrounding 
areas.”126  Even though the official Foreign Ministry position is that “surrounding areas” 
does not include Taiwan, on August 17, 1997, Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiryoku 
Kajiyama stated “in case of a Taiwan-China military conflict, how could we flatly refuse 
a request from the U.S. forces for support, even a supply of water?”127  In 2002, the 
United States, Japan, and Taiwan have held high-level strategic dialogues and a Japan-
Taiwan air defense conference was held in Taipei.128  In addition, Taiwan has been 
encouraged to purchase the same Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-III air defense 
system that the JSDF has bought from the United States.  China strategists are also 
troubled that the Japanese ballistic missile defense (BMD) development announced in 
September 1998 might also have an offensive “boost phase” or preemptive capability.  
Another point of dread for PLA strategists is the potential for the Japanese BMD and the 
U.S. national missile defense to effectively negate China’s first-strike capability, thus 
triggering a nuclear arms race.  
The second issue China took umbrage at was “meddling in internal 
affairs.”  In February 2002, after the so called “2 + 2” meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Consultative Committee, the joint statement included the common strategic objective to 
“encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through 
dialogue.”129  The Chinese Foreign Ministry strongly condemned any kind of bilateral 
statement that infringed on the sacrosanct “one China principle.”  In the Chinese view, 
the U.S.-Japan security alliance clearly exceeds the bounds of the defense of Japan and 
crosses the line into Chinese sovereignty.  Despite Japan’s claims that the BMD system is 
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aimed at “terrorists and rogue states,” Chinese view the strengthening of U.S.-Japan 
cooperation on BMD development as a means to restrict Beijing’s options regarding the 
Taiwan Straits.  Since its inception, Beijing has resented every purchase of weapons from 
the United States via the Taiwan Relations Act.  However, Taipei’s reticence to buy more 
weapons from the United States is rather frustrating for Washington because the PLA 
modernization efforts seem to indicate that the virtual military “stalemate” across the 
Taiwan Strait may soon tip in favor of the mainland.   
As a final note, the long-term prospects for a Taiwanese initiated 
independence referendum are very low.  Taiwan’s domestic politics between pan-blue 
and pan-green parties remain divided, which means the two-thirds majority necessary to 
initiate a national independence referendum will never likely come to fruition.130 
b. Territorial Disputes 
 One of the primary security concerns in Sino-Japanese relations is the 
handling of territorial disputes, namely the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands and the seabed 
resources in the East China Sea (ECS).  Even though these islands (one island and seven 
islets) are uninhabited, both Japan and China claim ownership.  The Chinese and 
Taiwanese position based on historical navigational records dating back to 1403 that refer 
to Diaoyutai as Taiwanese islands and should have been returned to Chinese sovereignty, 
but the KMT government did not immediately demand possession because U.S. forces 
took control of the islands.131  The Japanese position is that the islands should be treated 
like the rest of the Okinawan chain and were returned to Japanese possession in 1971.132  
Japanese nationalists built a lighthouse on the Uosturi Island in 1978 and Japanese 
government claims to have leased the Senkaku islands to private owners living on the 
nearby Ishigaki Island in 2002.  The Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands became the center of a 
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firestorm of both Japanese and Chinese nationalism in 2005, which contributed to the 
anti-Japanese riots, and continues to be a source of tension.133 
C. ENERGY SECURITY: “TURNING POISON INTO MEDICINE” 
The next section focuses on the opportunities for increased energy and military 
security cooperation.  Based on the diplomatic aims of the April 11-13, 2007 Sino-
Japanese summit held between Chinese Premiere Wen Jibiao and Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe, areas for cooperation were in the East China Sea and in energy technology 
exchange, which were defined as the Chinese development of safe nuclear power and 
energy conservation via energy efficient technology. 134   A third important energy 
security aspect, not mentioned in the 2007 summit, is the on-going debate regarding 
financial support for the Russian Siberian-Pacific pipeline and who will win the “energy 
game.”  While Washington does not have a direct policy stake in the bilateral energy 
policies these countries adopt, future regional stability hinges on the ability of both sides 
to circumvent conflict and accommodate their mutual energy security interests. 
1. Sea of Conflict or Cooperation? 
At the Sino-Japanese summit, Premiere Wen Jiabao referred to the East China Sea 
as the “sea of cooperation.”  Wen’s choice of words underplays the level of retrenchment 
that both the Japanese and Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs have encountered 
throughout their negotiation process.  Even after eight deliberations of the Japan-China 
Consultation on East China Sea and Other Matters, negotiators could not bridge the gap 
between their positions.135  The Japanese base their position on the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), which demarcates the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) by drawing a median line in cases when the line in the water 
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overlaps a neighboring countries claim to the same area.136  The UNCLOS EEZ principle 
allows for the development and preservation of the water, fish, and seabed exclusively to 
the owning country.  The Chinese position is based on a 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, which states that a country’s EEZ rights extend to the edge of the 
continental shelf as a “natural prolongation of the land.”137.  Both positions are based in 
international law and both have international precedents set in other disputes.  The joint 
development of four oil and gas fields -- Chunxiao (located 3 miles west of the median 
line) and Tianwaitian, Duanqiao, and Longjing -- which straddle the median line 
boundary remains the sticking point in negotiations.138  The Chinese have offered joint 
development of the areas in the overlapping EEZ, which the Japanese have flatly refused.  
The Japanese countered with the joint development of all the fields including the 
Chunxiao, which is already reportedly producing 300,000 cubic meter of gas a day since 
January 28, 2006, and the Chinese refused.139  While the estimates vary, what is at stake 
is approximately a three-year supply of natural gas (7 trillion cubic feet) and a 20-year 
supply of oil (100 billion barrels of oil) based on current consumption rates.140   
Why should the United States care about this dispute?  The East China Sea issue 
is being closely watched by Pacific Forces Command, and military strategists are 
currently “war gaming” potential options in the case of a direct military attack.  The 
simulation is based on 2004 and 2005 maritime scenarios, where PLAN naval vessels 
“played chicken” with a Japanese survey ship and a destroyer aimed its guns at a 
Japanese P3-C surveillance aircraft.141  The U.S. Department of State official stance on 
this issue is “that both sides should seek a peaceful resolution to the dispute.”  Resolution 
would require compromise on both sides and the political fortitude to withstand the 
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domestic blowback from nationalistic opposition.  Japan would have to give up the claim 
to EEZ rights from the disputed Senkaku Islands and China would have to give up its 
claim of continental shelf sovereignty, which would set an unfavorable precedent for 
other territorial disputes.  However, if the territorial claims could be availed, then an 
agreement could link several outstanding issues, like establishing permanent EEZ borders, 
joint development zones, and fisheries conservation into a single package.  
Currently, the Chinese have the upper hand because the Chunxiao drilling 
platform will apparently be ready to transport gas resources to Shanghai by early 2008.142  
Japanese concerns about whether the other fields are connected under the seabed will 
become irrelevant at that point.  Japanese bargaining power will be eroded because the 
“do nothing” plan risks losing all the resources.  In addition, the United Nations has said 
it will step in and arbitrate the dispute if it is not resolved bilaterally by May 2009.143   
2. Energy Cooperation Policy: Nuclear Power Plants and Energy 
Efficiency Technology 
Well respected in energy and economic circles, Jitsuo Terashima makes a case 
that Japan should follow the United States and merge its military and energy strategy into 
a comprehensive plan.144  Terashima advocates using the “New State Energy Strategy,” 
compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), as a cornerstone of 
the overall national strategic policy for cooperating with regional powers.  This strategy 
leverages one’s comparative strengths against a rival’s weakness, Japan’s advanced level 
of nuclear energy and energy conservation technology represents strength.  By the year 
2030, all of Japan’s 55 operating nuclear power plants will have to be refurbished.  Given 
Japan’s lack of natural resources, Terashima argues that Japan should increase the 
already high (30-40 percent) reliance on nuclear energy.  Another pillar of this energy 
strategy is to leverage Japan’s advances in recyclable energy and energy conservation.  
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Japan is already one of the most energy efficient countries in the world with an energy 
rating of 37 percent, twice as high as the United States.  Japan’s goal is to raise that to 41 
percent by 2030.145   
In contrast, China only has four operating nuclear power plants and an energy 
efficiency rating of four percent.  China needs to both increase its energy supply and 
reduce its demand if it is going to solve its impending energy crisis and sustain the 
double-digit growth into the next decade.  Japan is poised to offer help, but will likely 
attempt to bundle the energy aid with concessions in other strategic areas.  
Terashima also suggests that South Korea and Japan work with China, Thailand, 
and Myanmar to develop a consortium to jointly construct a canal and strategic reserve 
facilities in the Isthmus of Kra. 146   With Japan’s and South Korea’s large foreign 
currency reserves, the five countries could pool financial reserves under the auspices of 
the Asian Development Bank to coax Thailand and Myanmar to accept the inevitable 
environmental impacts.  Currently, China’s Sinopec and Thailand’s PTT are conducting a 
feasibility study to construct a 250 km overland pipeline to the Gulf of Thailand with 
large storage facilities and oil terminus stations on either end.147  While the feasibility 
study is still uncertain, if this project is half as successful as the pipeline along the Suez 
Canal, it would likely save $0.50 to $2.00 per barrel and reduce traffic through the Straits 
of Malacca.148 
3. The Russian Energy Triangle 
The abundant Russian oil and gas reserves in Central Asia and Siberia could 
potentially create a strategic triangle that could possibly alienate one of the three 
participants.  During negotiations on the trans-Siberian pipeline, with an estimated 
capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day, both Japan and China have tried to establish 
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agreements with Russia that exclude the other side from access to Siberian hydrocarbon 
resources.149  In 2003, the Russian energy giant Yukos and the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) signed a memorandum stating that they would plan to build a 2,300 
km pipeline from Eastern Siberia.  However, the Yukos chairman was jailed for failing to 
pay back taxes, and a Japanese proposal to build a 4,200 km pipeline to the Russian Far 
East looks to be more attractive to Transneft, the Russian oil pipeline monopoly.150  
Japan’s offer included $16 billion to finance the project, better technology to maintain the 
pipeline, and access to more oil markets on the Pacific seaport of Nakhodka.  Although 
the Siberian-Pacific pipeline project is mired in controversy because of the environmental 
impacts151, the project would boost the Russian economy and has President Putin’s 
unquestionable support.   
Another arena for competition for China and Japan are the Sakhalin I and 
Sakhalin II oil and natural gas projects.  Although initially started as a Shell, Mitsui, and 
Mitsubishi consortium, China is seeking a share of the resources now that exportation has 
begun.  Some analysts have held out hope that Chinese and Japanese gas companies 
could work together against Gazprom, the Russian gas giant, to negotiate cheaper 
prices.152  However, demand from other Northeast Asian consumers would ensure that 
market forces determined price. 
4. The Energy Game 
Tokyo’s inability to normalize relations with Moscow because of irreconcilable 
differences regarding the Northern Territories and China’s active military involvement in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will likely tip the energy security balance 
in favor of Beijing.  One of the major risks associated with oil and gas pipelines is 
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terrorist sabotage.  Therefore, China has had the impetus to foster military cooperation 
via the SCO with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan in joint counter-terrorism 
exercises between the PLA and Central Asia military forces.153  While Japan does have 
bilateral agreements with Brunei for oil and gas exports, China’s energy resources 
options in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia far outweigh the long range potential 
for deliverable fossil fuels.  China has also been investing in Australia and Indonesia to 
grab a greater share of production of the Northwest Shelf Project and the Tangguh 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) Project, respectively.154  The strategic shuffle to secure 
energy resources is certainly not over, but at this stage China seems to be edging out 
Japan in this energy game. 
D. MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS 
Since the beginning of military-to-military contacts in the 1980s, the relationship 
has always been obscured by complications stemming from the U.S.-Japan Security 
Alliance.  But recent events indicate that the relationship is becoming more independent 
and focused.  High-level security dialogues have been held on an official bilateral basis 
since 1993 and also on the fringe of multi-national forums.  In July 2006, the tenth 
bilateral security dialogue was held in Beijing, where vice foreign ministers presided over 
discussions where civilian and military officers exchanged views aimed at improving 
understanding.155  During the summer of 2006, mid-level military exchanges sponsored 
by the Sasakawa Foundation also discussed the exchange of students from their 
respective military academies. 156   In total, Japanese and Chinese military leaders 
officially have met 23 times between 1984 and 2006, but there were significant gaps 
between 2002 and 2006 due to Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine.  
During that time, however, government leaders still held security dialogues at multilateral 
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venues like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN+3, the China-South Korea-
Japan Summit, the Asian-Africa Summit, and APEC meetings.  Coordination on issues 
regarding Japanese abductees and North Korea nuclear testing occurred on the sides of 
these larger forums.   
The promotion of regional security provides another common area of interest for 
the PLA and JSDF.  An example of promoting security was the cooperation between the 
militaries to help clean up buried mustard gas and chemical weapons left behind by the 
Japanese Imperial Army.  In September 2000, 75 Japanese and 200 Chinese civilian and 
military personnel successfully removed some 900 chemical warfare shells left behind in 
the Heilongjiang province.  This issue plagued the Japanese judicial system for years, but 
military cooperation helped to ameliorate the situation.  In order to avoid conflict 
escalation in the East China Sea, hotlines have been establish at each respective military 
headquarter to enhance communication.  Future joint training exercises in humanitarian 
relief and natural disaster response are also being considered as well as agreements on 
how to handle potential incidents at sea.  China’s concern about terrorist and maritime 
piracy threats in the Straits of Malacca could also encourage collective participation in 
joint exercises with the littoral states of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.  Realizing the 
importance of the larger relationship, on September 1-3, 2007, Defense Minister 
Masahiko Komura met with the Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan -- the first 
such meeting since 2003.157  From November 28 to December 2, 2007, and a historic 
naval port call occurred where the PLAN missile destroyer Shenzhen conducted a four-
day good will visit in Tokyo Bay, the first such meeting since the 1930s.158 Overall, the 
bilateral military relationship is in the initial stages of developing a cooperative approach 
to future relations. 
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Using the strategic metaphor of a chessboard where key pieces are often “pinned 
down” by a combination of other pieces, the military balance of power regarding nuclear 
weapons and the Taiwan problem are virtually immoveable objects in the overall 
strategic context.  However, movement in terms of energy security is more likely in the 
next five to ten years.  Japan should be motivated to negotiate the joint development of 
the East China Sea and has leverage against China because of its comparative advantage 
in nuclear energy and energy conservation technology.  China has the upper hand 
regarding access to fossil fuels, but is leery of Japan’s BMD shield.  Both sides are 
working toward conflict avoidance as the military to military relationship further 
develops.  On the whole, “hard” security considerations are stable and the expansion of a 
potentially destabilizing arms race is unlikely.  A litmus test of the security relationship 
would be a breakthrough in the East China Sea (ECS) discussions.  While the author 
judges a breakthrough unlikely; recent editorials from the Asahi Shimbun following 
Prime Minister Fukuda’s December 27-30, 2007 official visit to Beijing indicate that 
“there is no need to be pessimistic” regarding the settlement of the gas fields.159   
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
A. SUMMARY 
1.  Anti-Japanese Nationalism is Limited 
The chapter on diplomatic issues challenged the conventional wisdom that anti-
Japanese sentiment is ruinous for positive bilateral relations.  While anti-Japanese 
nationalism is certainly a significant factor affecting the overall relationship, it is also 
limited by a pragmatic approach from Beijing as well as countered by positive trends in 
both Japan and China signaling greater cooperation in furthering common interests.  
However, the author’s assessment is that politicians on both sides will likely continue a 
cautious diplomatic approach and will likely “stay the course” with very little significant 
progress in areas like the East China Sea negotiations.   
2. Economic Interdependence is Limited 
The chapter on economic issues found that economic interdependence did not 
lead to empathy in diplomatic or security circles.  The main reasons for this are that 
decision-making priorities for the individuals involved (entrepreneurs, security specialists, 
and politicians) are uniquely different.  However, environmental interdependence did 
show promise as an area from which a “strategic mutually beneficial relationship” could 
be built.  An analysis of Sino-Japanese economic prospects for the next 20 years shows 
that China has the upper hand, which could significantly alter the current status quo of 
East Asian economic powers.  However, because economic and security linkages are 
weak, the economic rise of China should not lead to a dramatic spill over into the 
diplomatic or security context of the East Asia region. 
3.  Security Issues Remain Status Quo 
The chapter on security issues found that the security relationship remains static.  
Both sides are working toward conflict avoidance as the military-to-military relationship 
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further develops.  Existing frictions, like Taiwan or the East China Sea, have the potential 
to flare up into large-scale security problems; however, the political will to prevent 
escalation also exists.  Even though both sides are improving their military capabilities 
and wearily watching the other, the expansion of a potentially destabilizing arms race is 
unlikely.  Common national interests in energy security represent a potential area of 
cooperation and a foundation from which to build a strategic mutually beneficial 
relationship.   
Following the Rozman model illustrated below in figure 3, the optimists are 
constrained by nationalistic feelings that have derailed economic ties in the recent past.  
The “doomsayers” are also constrained by pragmatic decision-making and the regional 
security framework.  As long as the “hard” security component of the relationship 
remains static, as it is today, one should expect to see Sino-Japanese relations improve in 
the near-term.  However, because complex issues, like wartime reconciliation and 
territorial sovereignty, remain unresolved the long-term implications for Sino-Japanese 
relations are for bounded fluctuations between the optimists and the doomsayers.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Rozman’s Model 
B.  IF “STATUS QUO,” THEN WHAT? 
Given that Japan and China are locked in to their current pattern of constrained 
“cold politics and hot economics,” what type of policies should Japan, and the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, take towards China?  John Ikenberry asserts that U.S. foreign policy since the 
Cold War has followed a two pronged strategy of liberal engagement and realist 
Optimists Pessimists Doomsayers 
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containment.160  While the author agrees that engagement is necessary, the approach 
towards containment should be modified in China’s case. 
Historian Walter LeFeber commented that U.S. national interests are served when 
the Chinese government is strong enough to control its own people, yet weak enough to 
accede to U.S. demands.161  Keeping the Chinese government strong enough to control 
its own people is a primary goal of the economic engagement plan.  China faces 
numerous challenges in the next twenty years with a massive pollution problem, which 
ripples into areas like food security, (fresh) water security, and social unrest.  Beijing has 
improved the living standards of many of its people over the last 30 years with its rapid 
economic modernization, but sustaining such growth will become increasingly more 
difficult in the years ahead.   
The containment strategy used during the Cold War would not be advisable 
against China.  Unlike Eurasia, where clear East-West fault lines created a stable bipolar 
world, a divided Asia in a U.S.-China bipolar context would not be in U.S. interests.  
Rather, a passive containment strategy headquartered in Hawaii, but operationally 
managed from Guam and Japan would provide the United States close proximity to 
monitor, protect and forward its interests (i.e. SLOCs and Taiwan).  In that context, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. bases operating from Japan will remain a critically 
important element of maintaining stability in the region.   
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY  
U.S. policy towards Sino-Japanese relations should embrace the concept of 
developing a “strategic mutually beneficial relationship.”  The first of three policy 
recommendations is that the alliance should “wait and see” what happens in China – both 
economically and militarily.  Much of the speculation on the rise of China is based on 
                                                 
160 John G. Ikenberry, “Power and the Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2005, 133-152. 
161 Walter LeFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1997), 74. 
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economic models that predict China will have the largest economy by 2050.162  The 2007 
DoD Report to Congress noted that the PLA has purchased offensive weapons and are 
developing 5th generation fighters, but its respective employment strategies and 
operational capabilities are still unknown.  As the April 2007 INSS report from Michael 
McDevitt advocates, U.S. foreign policy toward this bilateral relationship should be “to 
help, or at least do no harm.”163  A premature move to counter a rising economic or 
military threat could create a “self fulfilling prophecy” and lead to conflict.164   
A second policy recommendation to protect against the future uncertainty of a 
belligerent China is to embrace China’s military diplomacy.  Key concepts for U.S. 
military planners would be to build an environment of “reciprocity and transparency” 
with open lines of communication to prevent escalation.  Dialogues need to be opened to 
examine why the incidents-at-sea agreement failed in the 2001 EP-3 incident and lessons 
learned need to be incorporated into future agreements to prevent reoccurrences.  
Confidence building measures are already in place to establish a predictable relationship, 
where both sides can begin the process of building trust.  Finally, coalition military 
exercise programs could be established with a focus on areas of mutual interest.  For 
example, the U.S.-Japan alliance is interested in reducing piracy in Southeast Asia, 
controlling potential pandemics in the region, enhancing disaster relief capabilities, 
enforcing nuclear non-proliferation treaties, preserving the environment, and combating 
terrorist networks.  Planning for both military engagement and confrontation will create 
inconsistencies in PACOM’s strategy towards China, but hedging against the unknown 
future provides a better set of long-term options.  
The third recommendation for sustaining the status quo relationship would be 
continued engagement under the auspices of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s 
line of encouraging Beijing to be a “responsible stakeholder.”  Both diplomatic and 
                                                 
162 Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050,” 
Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No: 99, October 1, 2003. 
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economic engagement would ensure American businessmen had access to the growing 
middle class in the Chinese market and that China is an insider in the twenty-first century 
“great game.”  Diplomatic pressure in the form of carrots would at least try to encourage 
China to adhere to the rules when it comes to the environment, law enforcement and 
basic human rights.  Some China watchers perceive that “the majority of Asian states 
currently view China as more benign than malign and are accommodating themselves to 
its rise.”165  Thus, the “responsible stakeholder” policy would not only encourage China 
to help resolve global problems, but also strengthen the existing international institutions 
which the United States maintains a leadership role.  While the playing field is never 
completely level, the liberal approach to foreign policy is much better than anarchy.166   
As mentioned in Chapter I, the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations is paramount 
to preserving stability in the region.  Encouraging policies that enhance both Sino-
Japanese and Sino-U.S. relations are in the best interest of the Asia-Pacific region and the 
United States.  Prematurely reacting to the rise of China by condemning it rather than 
embracing it would do more harm than good. 
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